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THE SECOND MEETING OF EXPERTS IN JULY 2004: 
 
COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS AND EFFECTIVE ACTIONS 
 
by Graham S. Pearson  
 
Introduction 
 
1.  This Briefing Paper considers the forthcoming Meeting of Experts of the States Parties to 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to be held in Geneva on 19 to 30 
July 2004 in preparation for the Meeting of States Parties to be held in Geneva on 6 to 10 
December 2004.  This is the second of the series of annual meetings agreed by the States 
Parties at the resumption of the Fifth Review Conference in November 2002 which agreed1 
the following: 
 
18.  At its eighth plenary meeting on 14 November 2002, the Conference decided by 
consensus, as follows: 
 
(a) To hold three annual meetings of the States parties of one week duration each 
year commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held not later than 
the end of 2006, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective 
action on: 
 
i.  The adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions 
set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
 
ii.  National mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight 
of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; 
 
iii.  Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
iv.  Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional 
efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and 
combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; 
 
v.  The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. 
 
(b) All meetings, both of experts and of States Parties, will reach any conclusions or 
results by consensus. 
 
(c) Each meeting of the States Parties will be prepared by a two week meeting of 
experts.  The topics for consideration at each annual meeting of the States Parties 
will be as follows:  items i and ii will be considered in 2003, items iii and iv in 2004, 
item v in 2005.  The first meeting will be chaired by a representative of the Eastern 
                                                 
1United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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Group, the second by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, 
and the third by a representative of the Western Group. 
 
(d)  The meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing their work. 
 
(e) The Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of these meetings and decide 
on further work. [Emphasis added] 
 
2.  As Nicholas Sims pointed out in Briefing Paper No. 22, a key element in the chapeau to 
the list of five topics in paragraph 18 (a) of the Final Report is the phrase "promote common 
understanding and effective action."   The hope of the proponents of this new process was 
that it would indeed generate "effective action”.   Unfortunately, the outcome of the meetings 
held in 2003 were disappointing.  As reported3 in the CBW Conventions Bulletin in 
December 2003. the first Meeting of States Parties on 10 to 14 November 2003 barely 
managed to reach agreement on a short statement of substance and failed to fulfil the promise 
which had been apparent at the end of the Meeting of Experts in August 2003.  The Final 
Report of the Meeting of Experts just managed to avoid paralleling that of the Meeting of 
Experts which comprised a procedural report and an annexed, but unanalyzed, collation of all 
the presentations, statements and contributions.  While there is significant value in 
maintaining a full record of the contributions made by States Parties, the lack of analysis and 
distillation, together with the short period of time, two months, between the Meeting of 
Experts and the Meeting of the States Parties contributed to the limited outcome of the 
Meeting of States Parties. It cannot be said to have successfully promoted common 
understanding and effective action as required by the mandate. 
   
3.  Against this background, there is an even greater need for the Meetings to be held in 2004 
to be effective in achieving their mandate of promoting common understanding and effective 
action.  After all, it will be widely recognized that there has been even greater public 
attention during the past year on the subject of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) given 
the continuing debate about WMD in Iraq and the continuing attention being given around 
the world to preparedness for bioterrorism. There is therefore a global expectation that the 
States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention will this year make more 
effective use of this opportunity to promote common understandings  and will take identify 
effective action to strengthen the international norm against biological weapons.   
  
4.   This Briefing Paper considers the two topics to be considered in 2004: 
 
iii.  Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
iv.  Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and 
existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of 
infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; 
 
                                                 
2 Nicholas A. Sims, The New  Multilateral Process For The BTWC: Ambiguities And Opportunities, University 
of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No.2 (Second Series), January 2003.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
3 Graham S. Pearson, The Biological Weapons Convention New Process, Report from Geneva, Review no 20, 
The CBW Conventions Bulletin, December 2003, pp. 20-28.  Available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/hsp 
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and considers what common understandings might be identified by the Meeting of Experts as 
well as what effective actions might be set out by the Meeting of Experts for the subsequent 
Meeting of States Parties to consider and develop.  The two topics will be considered in the 
same sequence as they are in the Provisional Agenda4 namely first surveillance of infectious 
diseases and then investigation of alleged use or suspicious outbreaks of disease. 
 
Procedural Aspects 
 
5. It needs to be recalled that this Meeting of Experts is part of the inter Review Conference 
process that will prepare the ground to enable the Second Meeting of the States Parties in 
December 2004 to set out and explore the common understandings that exist among the 
States Parties, identify best practice and thereby identify effective action to be taken by the 
States Parties and by the Sixth Review Conference in 2006.   As the Second Meeting of 
States Parties is a one week long meeting, its outcome cannot realistically be more than a few 
pages focussing on the central elements.   This Meeting of Experts needs to prepare the 
groundwork for the December 2004 Meeting of States Parties by setting out the common 
understandings and, especially, identifying the recommendations for effective action that 
emerge from this meeting.  An undigested collation of information is not helpful in meeting 
the requirement of the mandate for these meetings.  In considering language for the 
December 2004 Meeting of States Parties there is much to be said for drawing, where 
appropriate, from language agreed by States Parties at the Fourth and previous Review 
Conferences as the Meeting of States Parties in December 2004 is part of the inter Review 
Conference process between the Fifth and Sixth Review Conferences.  The use of language 
developed from that of the Fourth Review Conference offers the prospect of easy 
assimilation and further development at the Sixth Review Conference. 
 
6. The inclusion in the Provisional Agenda5 for this meeting of the item on the “Adoption of 
the factual report describing the work of the meeting” which mirrors the requirement in the 
mandate for the meeting of experts to “prepare factual reports describing their work” is 
welcomed.   A procedural report and an unanalyzed collation of material would represent a 
failure of the Meeting of Experts to carry out the necessary analysis to prepare the ground for 
the December 2004 Meeting of States Parties.  We recommend that the Report of the 
Meeting of Experts includes a listing of the common understandings and sets out 
recommendations for effective action that can be developed further at the Meeting of States 
Parties.  
 
National and International Mechanisms for the Surveillance, Detection, Diagnosis and 
Combating of Infectious Diseases Affecting Humans, Animals, and Plants 
 
7.   The Secretariat have prepared two relevant background papers.  The first6 is on the 
mechanisms being implemented for disease surveillance by the WHO, OIE and FAO  and by 
                                                 
4 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 19 – 30 July 2004, Provisional Agenda for the Meeting, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/1, 
10 June 2004.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
5 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 19 – 30 July 2004, Provisional Agenda for the Meeting, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/1, 
10 June 2004.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
6 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 19 – 30 July 2004, Mechanisms being Implemented for Disease Surveillance by 
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the Non-Governmental Organization, ProMED, and the second7 on the mechanisms for 
response to outbreaks of disease by the WHO, OIE and FAO.   
 
8.  The Executive Summary8 (BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.1/Summary) to the background 
paper on disease surveillance facilitates the identification of several common understandings 
in regard to disease surveillance. 
 
Disease Surveillance: Common Understandings and Effective Actions 
 
9.  Disease surveillance is an ongoing activity carried out at the international level by the 
WHO, OIE and FAO to detect or monitor the occurrence of disease for control purposes 
within human, animal and plant populations. 
 
10. The surveillance of infectious diseases arising from natural causes is the effective 
approach upon which all States have to build in considering the surveillance of outbreaks 
resulting from deliberate or accidental releases. The essential impartiality and neutrality of 
the three IGOs – the WHO, OIE and FAO – concerned with surveillance of human, animal 
and plant diseases needs to be recognized and safeguarded.  The States which are Party to 
the BTWC undoubtedly are at the forefront of the States in the world which recognize the 
risks and dangers posed by deliberate attacks of humans, animals and plants by disease and 
toxins whether carried out by States or by non-State actors and they can therefore be 
expected to make concerted efforts in the governing bodies of these IGOs to enhance their 
preparedness for deliberate attacks.  However, in so doing the States which are Party to the 
BTWC must take great care to ensure that such efforts do not impair the impartiality and 
independence of these IGOs.  
 
11.  It is recommended that the States that are Party to the BTWC should all become 
Member States of the WHO, OIE, FAO and the IPPC.  This could be facilitated by the 
Secretariat of the BTWC Meetings preparing a comparative tabulation showing the current 
status in regard to the WHO, OIE, FAO and IPPC of the State Parties to the BTWC.  
 
12.  It is recommended that the States that are Party to the BTWC should coordinate their 
actions in the Governing Bodies of the WHO, OIE, FAO and IPPC to encourage the 
strengthening and enhancement of the international disease surveillance system. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Intergovernmental Organizations (World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), World Organization for Animal Health/Office International des Epizooties (OIE)) and Significant 
Mechanisms being Implemented for Disease Surveillance by Non-Governmental Organizations, 
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.1, 1 July 2004.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
7  United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 19 – 30 July 2004, Mechanisms being Implemented for Response to Outbreaks of 
Disease by Intergovernmental Organizations (World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), World Organization for Animal Health/Office International des Epizooties (OIE)), 
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.2, 1 July 2004.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
8 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 19 – 30 July 2004, Mechanisms being Implemented for Disease Surveillance by 
Intergovernmental Organizations (World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), World Organization for Animal Health/Office International des Epizooties (OIE)) and Significant 
Mechanisms being Implemented for Disease Surveillance by Non-Governmental Organizations, 
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.1/Summary, 18 June 2004.  Available at http://www.opbw.org  
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13.   Noting that only the WHO has included preparedness and response to the deliberate 
release of disease in its mandate through the adoption by the World Health Assembly in May 
2002 of Resolution WHA 55.169, it is recommended that comparable action should be taken 
by the Governing Bodies of the OIE, FAO and IPPC to include preparedness and response to 
the deliberate release of animal and plant disease. 
 
14.   Strengthened national disease surveillance infrastructure, including human and 
technical resources, will directly contribute to more rapid control and response to human, 
animal and plant disease outbreaks regardless of their origin.  It is recommended that the 
States that are Party to the BTWC should take steps to strengthen their national disease 
surveillance infrastructure in respect of human, animal and plant diseases and report on what 
steps they have taken and their outcome in their national reports10 to the Sixth Review 
Conference. 
 
15.  Strengthened national preparedness and response to deliberate release of human, animal 
and plant diseases will bring benefits to all State Parties to the BTWC.  It should be noted 
that in preparing national plans for preparedness that there are important elements notably 
relating to assessment and prevention prior to any deliberate release as well as elements 
relating to actions to be taken after any deliberate release.   It is recommended that States 
Parties to the BTWC review their national preparedness and response plans to ensure that 
these include appropriate elements both prior to and after any deliberate release of human, 
animal or plant diseases.  Furthermore, we recommend that the States Parties report on the 
outcome11 of their national reviews of preparedness and response plans to the Sixth Review 
Conference. 
 
16. The Executive Summary12 (BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.1/Summary) to the background 
paper on disease surveillance notes that the States Parties to the BTWC have agreed to 
exchange information on outbreaks of infectious disease under Confidence-Building Measure 
B.  It is made clear that in providing such information the States Parties agreed to utilize fully 
existing national reporting systems on human diseases as well as animal and plant diseases.  
Consequently, it is evident that States Parties should be providing information under CBM B 
                                                 
9 World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 55.16 is reproduced in Annex III of United Nations, Meeting of the 
States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 19 – 30 
July 2004, Mechanisms being Implemented for Disease Surveillance by Intergovernmental Organizations 
(World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Organization for 
Animal Health/Office International des Epizooties (OIE)) and Significant Mechanisms being Implemented for 
Disease Surveillance by Non-Governmental Organizations, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.1, 1 July 2004.  
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
10 States Parties are invited prior to the Review Conference to provide contributions to the Secretariat for 
inclusion in the Background Document on Compliance by States Parties with All Their Obligations under the 
BTWC.  The reports by States Parties to the Sixth Review Conference proposed in this Briefing Paper could 
readily be included in these contribution submitted by States Parties prior to the Sixth Review Conference. 
11 States Parties are invited prior to the Review Conference to provide contributions to the Secretariat for 
inclusion in the Background Document on Compliance by States Parties with All Their Obligations under the 
BTWC.  The reports by States Parties to the Sixth Review Conference proposed in this Briefing Paper could 
readily be included in these contribution submitted by States Parties prior to the Sixth Review Conference. 
12 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 19 – 30 July 2004, Mechanisms being Implemented for Disease Surveillance by 
Intergovernmental Organizations (World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), World Organization for Animal Health/Office International des Epizooties (OIE)) and Significant 
Mechanisms being Implemented for Disease Surveillance by Non-Governmental Organizations, 
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.1/Summary, 18 June 2004.  Available at http://www.opbw.org  
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annually on human, animal and plant disease in accordance with the agreed formats for CBM 
B.   It is recommended that the Meeting of Experts should review the current requirements 
for the provision of information under CBM B and recommend how these might be clarified 
so as to ensure that the maximum benefits are gained by States Parties from the information 
provided under CBM B in regard to outbreaks of human, animal and plant diseases.   We 
further recommend that States Parties initiate reporting of improved submissions under 
CBM B in accordance with the recommendations made by the Meeting of Experts.  
 
 
International Capabilities for Responding to, Investigating and Mitigating the Effects of 
Cases of Alleged Use of Biological or Toxin Weapons or Suspicious Outbreaks of 
Disease 
 
17.  The Secretariat have prepared a relevant background paper13 which examines the 
provisions in Article VI and VII of the Convention relevant to the investigation of alleged use 
of biological or toxin weapons and to provide assistance in such cases and then examines 
appropriate international procedures, within the framework of the United Nations and in 
accordance with its charter, to investigate the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons and 
to provide assistance in such cases.   The background paper makes it clear in paragraph 5 that 
“This Background Document deals with mechanisms in place and does not examine Article V 
of the Convention …”  or instances such as an allegation that biological weapons were used 
some 20 years prior to the opening for signature of the Convention.   The latter is hardly 
surprising as allegations prior to the entry into force of the Convention are unlikely to be 
relevant to the work of the Meeting of Experts.  The exclusion of consideration of Article V 
of the Convention is surprising as it is an instance where mechanisms are in place and indeed 
have been exercised in relation to the compliance concerns raised by Cuba in 1997 – which 
are referred to in the Background Document.     
 
18.  Article V of the Convention is relevant as it is probable that an allegation of use would 
be preceded by a compliance concern. Article V of the Convention states that: 
 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to 
cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or 
in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.   Consultation and 
cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate 
international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in 
accordance with its Charter. 
 
At the Fourth Review Conference of the BTWC held on 25 November to 6 December 1996, 
the Final Declaration14 in respect of Article V stated that: 
 
1. The Conference notes the importance of Article V and reaffirms the obligation 
assumed by States Parties to consult and cooperate with one another in solving any 
                                                 
13 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 19 – 30 July 2004, Mechanisms Available to States Parties to Investigate the 
Alleged Use of Biological or Toxin Weapons and to Provide Assistance in such cases, 
BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.3, 1 July 2004.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
14United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva 1996.  
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problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the 
provisions of, the Convention. The Conference reiterates its appeal to States Parties 
made at the Third Review Conference to make all possible efforts to solve any 
problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the 
provisions of the Convention with a view towards encouraging strict observance of 
the provisions subscribed to. The Conference notes that this Article provides an 
appropriate framework for resolving any such problems, and reaffirms that any State 
Party which identifies such a problem should, as a rule, use these procedures to 
address and resolve it. 
 
2. The Conference also reviewed the operation of the procedures to strengthen the 
implementation of the provisions of Article V which were adopted in the Final 
Declaration of the Third Review Conference and which built on the agreements 
reached at the Second Review Conference. While noting that these procedures have 
not yet been invoked, the Conference reaffirmed their present validity. The 
Conference calls on any State Party which identifies a problem arising in relation to 
the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention to use these 
procedures, if appropriate, to address and resolve it. 
 
3. The Conference reaffirms that consultation and cooperation pursuant to this 
Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within 
the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. 
 
19.  In the Bradford Briefing Book for the Fifth Review Conference, the section on Article V 
noted15 that the consultative process developed by the Third Review Conference had been 
invoked in 1997 by Cuba subsequent to the Fourth Review Conference.  It was considered 
that the consultative process had worked well and it was suggested that the Fifth Review 
Conference might adopt modified language in the Article V section of its Final Declaration 
along the following lines: 
 
2. The Conference also reviewed the operation of the procedures to strengthen the 
implementation of the provisions of Article V which were adopted in the Final 
Declaration of the Third Review Conference and which built on the agreements 
reached at the Second Review Conference. The Conference noted that these 
procedures had been invoked since the Fourth Review Conference and that the 
procedures had been satisfactorily utilized thereby demonstrating their utility.   The 
Conference calls on any State Party which identifies a problem arising in relation to 
the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention to use these 
procedures, if appropriate, to address and resolve it. 
 
20.  The Background Document also makes no mention of the provisions in Article IX 
Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding or Article X Assistance and Protection Against 
Chemical Weapons in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  It will be recalled that the 
prohibitions of the CWC and the BTWC rightly overlap in respect of mid-spectrum agents as 
shown in the schematic  shown below. 
 
                                                 
15 Graham S. Pearson, Article V: Consultation and Cooperation in Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & 
Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Fifth  Review 
Conference, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, November 2001. Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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21.  It will be recalled that two toxins – Ricin and Saxitoxin – are included in Schedule 1 of 
the CWC.  It is highly probable that if there were to be an allegation of the use of toxin 
weapons then any investigation would take place under the provisions in Article IX or X of 
the CWC and that the provisions for assistance and protection under Article X of the CWC 
might be invoked.   Part XI of the Verification Annex to the CWC sets out the provisions for 
Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons.  In regard to the provisions for 
assistance, paragraph 8 of Article X states that: 
 
8.  Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedures set forth in 
paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, to receive assistance and protection against the use or 
threat of use of chemical weapons if it considers that: 
 
(a) Chemical weapons have been used against it; 
 
(b) Riot control agents have been used against it as a method of warfare; or 
 
(c) It is threatened by actions or activities of any State that are prohibited for 
States Parties by Article I. 
 
22.  The Background Document also makes the statement under the heading “Precedents of 
Investigations by the Secretary-General into the Alleged Use of Biological or Toxin 
Weapons” that “the investigative process detailed above has been initiated to investigate the 
alleged use of chemical weapons, but has not, to date, been initiated for the investigation of 
biological or toxin weapons.”  Whilst this is correct in regard to the investigative process 
detailed in the late 1980s, it is at variance with a statement provided by the Centre for 
Disarmament Affairs to a UN document16 in 1997 that states “while the Secretary-General 
has, in the past, conducted investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons and of alleged 
violations by some States parties of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Organization is 
not in a position to make a definitive judgement on these reports of alleged use.”  The 
Background Document makes no mention of the Secretary-General investigation carried out 
                                                 
16 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/27, 24 
June 1997, paragraph 14.  Available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1997/documentation/subcommission/e-
cn4-sub2-1997-27.htm 
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in 1981/82 of the allegations of use in South-East Asia – the so-called “yellow rain” attacks – 
which were alleged by the United States to have been violations of the BTWC, probably 
because the UN General Assembly resolution17 called for this investigation to ascertain the 
facts pertaining to the reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons.   
 
Investigations of Alleged Use: Common Understandings and Effective Actions 
 
23.   The common understanding should be recognized in regard to the investigation of an 
alleged use of biological or toxin weapons and the provision of assistance of the importance 
of three Articles – V, VI and VII – of the BTWC.   
 
24.  In addition, it should be recognized that any allegations relating to the use of toxin 
weapons would be carried out under Article IX of the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
that assistance and assistance against such toxin weapons would be under Article X of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. 
 
25.   A further common understanding is that although the UN Secretary-General has been 
authorized by successive UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions to 
investigate the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, any such investigation of an 
alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease would only take place 
on the territory of a State which has requested the Secretary-General to carry out such an 
investigation. 
 
26.  It is recommended that a number of effective actions need to be taken.   First, the States 
that are Party to the BTWC should take steps, as appropriate, in the United Nations Security 
Council and General Assembly to strengthen the procedures available under the United 
Nations and their preparedness to investigate the alleged use of biological weapons and 
unusual outbreaks of disease.  In particular, a roster of trained and qualified inspectors 
who can be called upon at short notice (within 7 days) to carry out an investigation needs to 
be established and maintained.  No person should appear on the roster until after that person 
has successfully completed a UN training course.   Persons on the roster should be required 
to carry out refresher training courses on a regular basis in order to retain their inclusion on 
the roster.   
 
27.  In addition, it is recommended that a system for the collection and analysis of 
duplicate and control samples including chain of custody provisions needs to be established 
and proven by appropriate trials on a regular basis.   Moreover, arrangements need to be 
established for a network of accredited laboratories in more than one country, which have 
a demonstrated capability using internationally validated analytical methods, for the analysis 
of samples collected during such an investigation. 
 
28. Furthermore, it is recommended that the procedures thus far established by the 
Secretary-General for the investigation of alleged use of biological weapons be reviewed to 
determine whether the procedures are adequate and appropriate for the investigation of the 
alleged use of biological weapons against humans, animals and plants. 
 
29. Finally, we recommend that all State Parties to the BTWC should report to the Sixth 
Review Conference on what actions they have taken in the United Nations and elsewhere to 
                                                 
17 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 35/144 C Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. 
12 December 1980.  Available at http://www.un.org 
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strengthen the procedures available and their preparedness to investigate the alleged use of 
biological weapons and unusual outbreaks of disease. 
 
Conclusions 
 
29. In conclusion, the Second Meeting of Experts is recommended to adopt language for its 
factual report that sets out the common understandings that are evident from the 
consideration of the two topics – disease surveillance and investigation of alleged use – by 
the Meeting of Experts, and provides a list of the effective actions identified during the 
Meeting of Experts to be considered further by the States Parties at their meeting in 
December 2004. 
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